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Abstract
This paper reviews experimental studies that investigate the effects of communication on be-
havior in organizational settings. Two main classes of studies are identified: (a) studies on
coordination and competition, which include experimental research that tests whether com-
munication can help to overcome coordination failure within organizations, and (b) studies
that analyze the role of communication in alleviating problems arising from information asym-
metries at the workplace. The evidence from these studies indicates that communication is
suited to improve efficient coordination within firms and to mitigate information problems in
employer-employee relationships. In addition, studies are presented that focus on the interac-
tion between communication and monetary incentive schemes in companies.
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1 Introduction
Communication is an important element of the interaction in the workplace and can crucially de-
termine the success of an organization. This has been widely recognized by research in the field
of management. For example, Harris and Nelson (2007) point out the decisive role of communica-
tion describing it as “one of the most dominant activities occurring in any work setting” (p.12).
Hutchinson (2014) argues that communication in the context of human resource management
practices may help to clarify the organization’s goals for the employees, to increase the employ-
ees’ commitment and to strengthen the relationship between the employer and the employees.
Den Hartog et al. (2013) maintain that the views of managers and employees on human resource
management practices are more aligned when the communication between these two groups is of
high quality, meaning that managers communicate sufficiently, that the information conveyed is
useful, and that it is properly understood by the employees.
In the economic analysis of strategic interactions at the workplace, communication between
players often has a “cheap talk” character, in the sense that messages do not have a direct effect
on the payoffs associated with different strategies. Yet, in experimental tests this kind of com-
munication is found to be very effective in changing behavior which in turn can affect the payoffs
of the interaction partners (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). Economic theory has provided important
insights into the role of communication, both for strictly rational and boundedly rational players.
For instance, it has been shown that private information about interaction partners can be revealed
in equilibrium, provided the incentives of the involved parties do not create too severe conflicts of
interests (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Crawford, 1998). Moreover, communication makes it possible
for boundedly rational players to coordinate better and achieve higher average payoffs in games
with common interests, such as stag-hunt games (Ellingsen and O¨stling, 2010). At the same time,
it has been argued that depending on the type of game, communication flows (e.g., either one-sided
or two-sided communication) may crucially determine its influence on coordination success.
There is also empirical experimental evidence that the possibility for decision-makers to com-
municate with each other has a substantial impact on efficiency and payoff allocations in a variety
of economic settings. Communication has been found to enhance cooperation in social dilemma
experiments (Balliet, 2010, provides a meta study of the literature), to significantly affect altruistic
behavior (see, e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2005; Mohlin and Johannesson, 2008; Andreoni and Rao,
2011), and to foster coordination (see, e.g., Cooper et al., 1992; Charness, 2000; Duffy and Feltovich,
2002, 2006; Blume and Ortmann, 2007). Bolton et al. (2003) find that the organization of com-
munication flows significantly affect the outcomes achieved in coalitional bargaining and Brandts
et al. (2016) show that communication affects contract choices. Furthermore, communication has
been found to affect behavior in strategic market entry games. In a limit pricing game, Cooper
and Kagel (2005) report that teams who are able to communicate with each other exhibit stronger
strategic play than individuals. In a related study, the same authors observe higher frequencies of
strategic play in teams with two-sided communication compared to an advisor-advisee treatment
in which only one-sided communication is possible (Cooper and Kagel, 2016). These latter results
highlight the relevance of the exact nature of the communication process for its effectiveness. As
it is often difficult to incorporate the communication process in theoretical models, due to its com-
plexity in strategically rich environments, experimental studies are an important vehicle to gain
an understanding in that respect (Brandts et al., 2019, provide an extensive survey among other
things on the effects of the communication process on behavior in experimental studies).
Many studies listed so far do not explicitly refer to company settings. Still, an increasing
number of experimental studies has focused on the role of communication in interactions within
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organizations. The experimental approach is especially well-suited for this purpose for at least
the following reasons. First, the effects of communication on behavior are difficult to study with
observational field data (for instance, company data), as it is basically impossible to reliably track
communication patterns between colleagues or between managers and team members. Second, the
alternative of using surveys to get insights into the communication patterns and contents between
managers and employees also has some shortcomings. For instance, data from surveys might be
noisy and inconsistent due to the lack of explicit incentives to think carefully about potential
answers. Survey answers about the role of communication within the organization also might not
provide the correct picture because of socially desirable answers (e.g., if employees are asked about
the way their supervisors communicate with them).
Experiments circumvent some of these problems by providing explicit performance based in-
centives and by controlling the way communication can take place as well as by restricting the
feasible communication content. Regarding the role of communication in organizations mostly
laboratory experiments and a few field experiments have been been conducted. Both types of ex-
periments have their advantages and disadvantages (for a discussion, see, e.g., Harrison and List,
2004; Levitt and List, 2007; Falk and Heckman, 2009; Levitt and List, 2009) and should be viewed
as complementary approaches in gaining insights into the role of communication at the workplace.
This paper focuses on studies related to the topics “coordination and competition” and “asym-
metric information” because those are of central relevance for processes within organizations. Co-
ordination of activities is key to achieve the goals of organizations in which a large number of
members take independent but interactive decisions. The degree to which coordination can be
successfully achieved depends on incentives. In some cases, the incentives of agents are aligned
so that everyone profits from successful collaboration, making it relatively easy to achieve coordi-
nated behavior that is also in line with the organization’s interest. In other circumstances, agents
or organizational units compete against each other, which may lead to uncoordinated actions and
outcomes that are not necessarily benefiting the organization. Information asymmetries are a cen-
tral barrier in the interaction at the workplace as the interests of employers and employers may
often be in conflict. Problems arise because the actions of one party cannot be (fully) observed by
the other party (such as the effort exerted by the worker) or because some relevant aspect of the
labor relationship is private information (such as the ability of the employee).
A number of experimental studies in the context of organizations have been conducted to gain
insights into the role of communication in mitigating adverse effects arising from coordination
problems and information asymmetries. This paper provides a selective review of these studies
especially relevant for organizations. It also focuses predominantly on studies that implement ex-
ante communication, which refers to communication that takes place before players decide on their
actions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, studies are reviewed that focus on
the effects of communication on coordination within organizations and on the interaction effects
of communication and competition in these settings. Section 3 focuses on studies on moral-hazard
problems that arise when managers have no direct control over the effort choices of their sub-
ordinates. Section 4 briefly outlines studies that analyze the interaction of communication with
incentive schemes and the subsequent impact on employee motivation and counterproductive be-
havior. Section 5 briefly summarizes the findings from the literature and concludes.
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2 Coordination and Competition
Organizational success depends on the (often) independent decisions and actions of a group of
actors. In particular, the achievement of organizational goals may require managers and employees
to coordinate their actions in a particular way. Such coordination problems are often complex tasks.
For instance, companies with multiple divisions might need to integrate and coordinate decisions
made at different levels (e.g., production planning, distribution, marketing). Firms might have
several production plants making semi-finished products that need to be assembled into final
products. Manufacturing choices at these plants need to be coordinated, because the production
of the final good depends on the efforts of each separate plant.
Often coordination problems have a weakest-link feature where a group’s outcome is determined
by the lowest level of any member’s input. A classic example of a weakest-link problem, involves
the manufacturing of products that require different production steps and where the overall quality
of the product depends on the quality of any single item. Also, multinational organizations tend
to have multi-tiered global supply chains, including sellers, partners, subcontractors and sponsors,
which are all linked together in complex networks, where a problem in one area can easily have
damaging effects up and down the chain.
Many experimental studies reviewed in this paper use the weakest-link game, which is also
known as ‘weak-link game’ and ‘minimum effort game’, to capture these aspects and illustrate
the problems that may arise when the members of an organization fail to coordinate their actions
(for the seminal experimental paper, see Van Huyck et al., 1990, and for a recent contribution,
see Riedl et al., 2016). In the weakest-link game, two or more players have to choose among
several actions, often coined as effort levels. It has multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies that
can be Pareto-ranked. The highest Pareto-ranked equilibrium is payoff-dominant, generating the
largest joint surplus, and requires that each player chooses the highest effort. Choosing high effort,
however, entails some risk, because the player who chooses high effort levels is harmed if anyone
else chooses a low effort level. Thus, low effort can be considered as a safe (equilibrium) choice in
this game, which is inefficient. A main question addressed in the papers that are reviewed in the
following is whether communication can help overcoming this low efficiency trap.
2.1 Coordination with aligned incentives
The effects of costless communication in coordination games have been widely studied in exper-
imental economics and many studies have shown that cheap talk can be effective at resolving
coordination failure and inefficient coordination (see for instance the studies cited in the intro-
duction). For example, Blume and Ortmann (2007) study whether communication can help to
coordinate on the efficient outcome in the minimum and median effort games. The median effort
game is structurally similar to the minimum effort game, except that the group outcome is deter-
mined by the median effort level, rather than the minimum, chosen in the group. In both games,
subjects in groups of nine choose among seven effort levels in eight rounds. In both the median
and the minimum effort games, the most efficient outcome requires subjects to choose the highest
effort level.
The authors compare treatments with and without pre-play communication, where in the for-
mer the members of a group can send each other a message regarding the intended effort level,
before they make the effort choice. The results show that the efficient equilibrium is chosen signif-
icantly more often in the median and the minimum effort games with communication than in the
same games without communication, suggesting that costless cheap-talk messages help overcome
problems of strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure.
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Brandts and Cooper (2007) are among the first to study coordination in an organizational frame.
They introduce a “corporate turnaround game” where a manager interacts with four employees.
The employees play a weakest-link game, where each employee simultaneously has to choose a
costly effort level and mutual gains may only be obtained if everyone exerts high effort. From a
rational and selfish perspective, to be willing to choose a higher effort level, each employee must
believe that the others will also choose a higher effort level. Therefore, the manager’s task is to
find a way to affect employees’ beliefs about each other’s actions.
The authors study the role of communication in this setting in three treatments: No Com-
munication, One-Way Communication and Two-Way Communication. In all treatments subjects
play thirty rounds of the turnaround game in fixed groups of five. In the first ten rounds of the
experiment, the manager simply observes what employees do. The rationale behind this first set of
ten rounds is to let players experience coordination failure prior to the managerial interventions,
to be able to explore whether managers can overcome a history of coordination failure. In the re-
maining twenty rounds, the manager chooses a bonus rate for the employees in each round, which
determines how much additional pay each employee receives per unit increase in the minimum
effort. The employees observe the bonus rate and then select effort levels.
In the No Communication treatment, the manager can only use monetary incentives by choosing
the bonus rate. In One-Way Communication, the manager chooses the bonus rate and at the same
time can send a free-form cheap talk message to the employees. All the employees see the bonus
rate and the message before choosing their effort levels. Two-Way Communication differs from
the previous treatment in that employees can send a message back to the manager when they
choose their effort level. In this case, messages are only received by the manager, but not the other
employees. Treatment comparisons allow the authors to explore how effective communication in
combination with financial incentives is at fostering coordination compared to financial incentives
alone, as well as if the communication channel (one- versus two-way communication) matters for
effort provision.
In all three treatments, Brandts and Cooper (2007) find that without communication and bonus
payments (during the first ten rounds of the game) coordination on high effort almost never oc-
curs. In the remaining 20 rounds, effort levels remain low in the bonus payment treatment without
communication. In contrast, in both the one- and two-way communication treatments, higher
minimum effort and higher payoffs are observed. The authors conclude that a manager’s com-
munication strategy has a larger impact on effort than the choice of a bonus rate. Moreover,
two-way communication between the manager and the employees works better than one-way com-
munication. A detailed analysis of the content of the messages sent reveals that the most effective
managers’ messages are those that request a specific effort level, emphasize the mutual benefits of
high effort and the bonus rate chosen.
Kriss et al. (2016) investigate the role of communication in solving coordination problems in
a weakest-link game, addressing the issue of costly and voluntary communication. They compare
four treatments along two dimensions. They vary, first, whether communication is voluntary or
mandatory and, second, whether and how much employees have to pay for each message they send.
In all treatments, fixed groups of nine subjects in the role of employees interact for eight periods.
In the Mandatory Communication treatment (MandCom), all subjects have to send a message at
no cost before choosing their effort level. Messages can only contain a number corresponding to a
level of effort in the game. In order to study whether participants would choose to communicate
and what would be the effect of communication on coordination in this case, in the Voluntary
Communication with Full Subsidy treatment (FullSubsidy) subjects can—but do not have to—
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send a message. If they do send a message, this is at no cost. The Voluntary Communication with
No Subsidy treatment (NoSubsidy) is the same as the one just described, except that employees
have to pay a small fee when sending a message. Lastly, in the Voluntary Communication with a
Partial Subsidy treatment (PartialSubsidy), employees also have to bear a cost when they send
a message but this is lower than in NoSubsidy. Comparing the last two treatments to NoSubsidy
allows for identification of whether the use of messages is affected when employees have to incur
at least some communication costs, and whether this in turn affects how successful employees are
at coordinating on high effort levels.
In this study the average effort and the minimum effort are highest when communication is
mandatory and for free (MandCom). If communication is voluntary and for free (FullSubsidy)
almost all employees send a message, which results in similar effort levels and payoffs as in Mand-
Com. When sending a message entails a cost, the modal behavior is not to send a message. Even
the very small cost in PartialSubsidy substantially decreases the use of messages relative to
when communication is free. Importantly, participants to respond to incentives as messages are
sent more persistently over time when communication costs are low than when they are high. The
lesser use of communication has an adverse effect on the minimum effort. In No Subsidy it quickly
approaches the lowest possible level, whereas it is higher in PartialSubsidy but still lower than
when communication is free. The results of this study strongly suggest that in order to facilitate
coordination on higher effort equilibria in work teams, firms need to keep employees’ communica-
tion costs low as otherwise communication does not take place, preventing its potentially positive
effect to take roots.
Studying coordination problems that arise from a change in the composition of a group, Fehr
(2017) investigates the effect of endogenous communication and whether subjects realize that
communication may be helpful when experiences differ. The author implements three treatments
which differ in whether communication is endogenous (EndCom), exogenously imposed (ExCom)
or absent (Base). The experiment consists of two parts. In Part I, which is common to all
treatments, twelve subjects are randomly assigned to four groups of three and play 10 rounds of a
weakest-link game. At the end of this part, the four groups are ranked according to their minimum
effort in the 10th round and matched such that a group of rank r ∈ {1, 2} is combined with a group
of rank r + 2. Thus, in Part II, two new groups of size 6 are formed. In each of these two groups,
subjects are informed about the minimum effort the new members had chosen in the last round of
Part I (i.e., group r learns the minimum effort chosen by group r + 2 in the 10th round of Part I,
and vice versa). Before the first round in Part II (round 11), subjects in EndCom vote on whether
to implement a pre-play communication stage that would allow them to send a message before the
effort decision in each of the remaining ten periods at a small cost. The message corresponds to an
effort level of the weakest-link game, as in Kriss et al. (2016), The voting procedure is such that in
each group one subject is randomly chosen and her decision is implemented for the whole group.
The communication cost, however, has to be paid in each period by all subjects in a group where
communication is available, irrespective of voting behavior. Moreover, to test whether subjects in
less successful groups in Part II would revise their voting decision, in five randomly chosen sessions
of EndCom a third part is implemented. At the beginning of Part III, subjects have to vote again
on communication and play the game for another five rounds in the same group. There is no voting
taking place in ExCom and Base.
The results show that individual effort, minimum effort and payoffs in treatment ExCom are
substantially higher than in Base, where there is no communication. In contrast, there is no
significant difference in outcomes between a setting with exogenously implemented communication
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and a setting where subjects have the option to vote for the use of communication. This suggests
that communication is effective at improving coordination irrespective of whether it is endogenously
chosen or exogenously imposed. Focusing on the treatment with endogenous communication, Fehr
(2017) notes, however, that only half of the subjects vote for communication and that subjects who
experience miscoordination or inefficient coordination in Part I are those who mostly vote in favor
of implementing communication. In EndCom, subjects who are in groups with communication
choose higher effort levels, leading to higher minimum effort and higher payoffs, than subjects
who are in groups where communication has not been implemented. Moreover, when given the
chance to vote again in Part III, subjects who voted against communication in Part II do not revise
their initial voting decision and continue to coordinate on the inefficient equilibrium. The author
interprets the latter result as suggesting that subjects who experience inefficient coordination or
coordination failure do not consider communication as a device to improve coordination and are
therefore not willing to incur the (small) implementation cost.
A study by Brandts and Cooper (2018) focuses on the impact of the organizational structure on
coordination and compares the performance of centralized and decentralized organizational forms
by means of the “decentralization game”. This is a coordination game played by a central manager
and two divisions. Under centralization, the central manager assigns product types to each division,
while under decentralization, division managers choose their own product types. The profit of each
division depends on local tastes, a randomly determined state of the world, and the product types.
The manager’s profit is given by the sum of the divisions’ profits. The central manager knows
the probability distribution over states, whereas the divisions know the actual state of world.
The game is constructed in such way that both, coordination over divisions’ product choices and
taking advantage of divisions’ private information are necessary to maximize total surplus. Under
centralization, the only equilibria are babbling equilibria in which the divisions’ reports reveal no
useful information to the central manager and the central manager chooses the same product type
for both divisions. Centralization is predicted to achieve coordination but not efficiency. Under
decentralization, efficient coordination (i.e., maximization of total profits) requires that divisions
coordinate on different product types, depending on the state of the world. This makes efficient
coordination a relatively complex task.
In all treatments, fixed groups of three subjects play the decentralization game for 18 periods.
In the two Baseline treatments with decentralization and centralization (BaseDec and BaseCen),
manager and divisions cannot communicate, apart from reports about the state of the world that
divisions make for the manager. In other treatments the authors study the effect of different forms
of communication. In a treatment called Division Suggestions (DivSug), divisions send messages
about which products to choose before decisions are made. In treatment Manager Suggestions
(ManSug), before divisions choose their product types, the central manager sends a menu of
suggestions about what product types to choose for each state of the world. In both these treat-
ments messages are pre-determined and the divisions choose their own product types. In two other
treatments, communication features free-form chats. In Chat-Decentralization (ChatDec), the
two divisions can talk freely prior to choosing product types. In Chat-Centralization (ChatCen),
the central manager and two divisions can talk freely before the central manager chooses product
types for the divisions.
The results of this study can be summarized as follows. In the Baseline treatments, centraliza-
tion leads to more efficient coordination than decentralization because in the latter divisions fail
to coordinate their product types. Allowing for limited communication in the form of manager or
division suggestions does not improve the efficiency of coordination relative to the Baseline treat-
ments. In both DivSug and ManSug, decentralization results in persistent miscoordination or
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inefficient coordination. In stark contrast, free-form chats appear to help solving the coordination
problem under decentralization. Performance in ChatDec is similar to performance in BaseCen,
because divisions tend to coordinate on the safe equilibrium. Total surplus in ChatCen is signif-
icantly higher than in both ChatDec and the BaseCen. The reason for the better performance
of free-form chat when decision making is centralized lies in the fact that the efficient outcome is
chosen much more frequently than in the other treatments. This efficient coordination is mostly
due to the fact that divisions tend to reveal truthful information and rarely lie about the state of
the world.
2.2 Coordination with negative externalities
The studies surveyed so far show that communication has a great potential to enhance efficiency in
organizational coordination problems. A common denominator of these studies is that incentives of
agents are aligned and that enhanced coordination creates better outcomes for everyone. However,
in some situations better coordination may not always imply higher overall efficiency. For instance,
when coordinated actions of some agents cause negative externalities on other agents, the overall
effect on group surplus might in fact be detrimental. In the following, the focus is on studies that
have analyzed the interaction of communication and coordination in this kind of settings.
Sutter and Strassmair (2009) focus on the contrasting effects that communication may have in
settings where teams compete with each other. On the one hand, allowing for communication might
induce within-team cooperation, which would increase organizational performance. On the other
hand, it might also facilitate between-teams collusion on low effort, which would be detrimental
for the overall performance of the organization.
The authors implement a game where groups of six workers are split in two teams which compete
for a prize. In each team, workers individually and independently choose an effort level, which
contributes to the production of the team’s output. The team with the higher output wins the
tournament. The tournament is repeated for ten rounds, during which teams are kept fixed and
the same two teams compete with each other.
The main treatment variables are whether members of a team can communicate only with each
other, or can also send messages to the competing team. The treatment NoComm serves as control
and does not permit communication. In Intra, members of a team can communicate only within
their own team. In Inter, competing teams can communicate with each other, but within-team
communication is not possible. In the treatment Intra+Inter, all messages are public for all
members of the two competing teams. In an additional treatment, Endo, subjects can choose
whether to communicate only with their own team members or whether messages can be sent
also to the competing team. The endogenous treatment is implemented to check for subjects’
preferences for explicit collusion.
The results of this study show that in all treatments where communication within teams is possi-
ble (Intra, Intra+Inter and Endo) effort levels are significantly higher and more homogeneous
than in the treatment without communication. Allowing for between-teams communication lowers
effort to levels close to those observed in the treatment without communication. In most cases,
team members use the within-team messages to try to coordinate on identical effort levels, which
increases effort levels. When between-teams messages are allowed, teams try to collude by agreeing
on taking turns in winning, which pushes efforts down. These results indicate that communication
within teams facilitates coordination and proves to be an efficient means to increase cooperation
and reduce the free-riding within a team. However, communication between teams can lead to
collusion and to significantly lower efforts and organizational performance.
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Cason et al. (2012, 2017) also explore the potentially harmful effects of (within-group) communi-
cation by means of competitive coordination games. Competitive coordination games capture those
situations, frequent in organizations, where teams compete against each other and where a team’s
success in coordinating within-group efforts often determines the outcome of the between-group
competition. To study such contexts, the authors embedded a weakest-link game in a competitive
rent-seeking contest. In the weakest-link game, subjects in groups of three make their effort choices
simultaneously, knowing that the higher the effort level they choose the higher is the chance their
group would win a prize against another randomly paired group. Groups play this stage game for
30 periods. A key feature of this framework is that while, ceteris paribus, coordination on higher
efforts increases the probability of winning the prize, and therefore the expected payoff of that
group, it also reduces the expected payoff of the competing group. Hence, in this setting higher
effort is socially wasteful because, due to the negative externality imposed on the competing group,
efficiency decreases with higher effort and increases when players of both groups manage to coor-
dinate on lower effort levels. This is the main difference with the aforementioned study by Sutter
and Strassmair (2009), where higher efforts increase payoffs. Another difference is that a team’s
effort is determined by a weakest-link game instead of an additive effort game. Moreover, in Cason
et al. (2012, 2017) the prize is rewarded according to a probabilistic contest success function rather
than deterministically awarded to the group with the higher effort.
To explore whether intra-group communication can damage efficiency and decrease social wel-
fare, Cason et al. (2012) implement six different treatments. In the baseline treatment (NoComm),
subjects simply play the described game without being able to communicate with each other. In
three group communication treatments, subjects can send free-form messages before making their
effort choices. In treatment Intra, subjects in both groups can send messages only to members
of their own group (3-person chat). In treatment Inter, subjects in the two groups can commu-
nicate with each other, such that each message is seen by everyone in the two groups (6-person
chat) and no private within-group messages are allowed. In treatment Intra+Inter, subjects
can send messages both in the 3- and in the 6-person chats, where in the former case, only own
group members can see the messages and in the latter, messages are observable by everyone in both
groups. In two additional treatments the two groups are replaced with two individual players who
compete for a prize. From an organizational perspective the latter treatments are less interesting
and are not discussed further here.
The authors find that intra-group communication leads to significantly greater within-group co-
ordination and higher efforts than in a setting where communication is not allowed. Consequently,
this kind of communication results in substantially lower overall payoffs and efficiency. On the
other hand, allowing inter-group communication, besides improving within-group coordination,
reduces competition between groups leading to significantly lower effort levels, higher payoffs and
higher efficiency relative to the NoComm treatment. The highest level of efficiency is reached
when both types of communication are allowed (Intra+Inter). In this case, subjects coordinate
on low effort levels which yields high payoffs.
Cason et al. (2017) build on the former study to further investigate conditions under which
communication may have detrimental effects on efficiency. In particular, they study the impact of
asymmetric and endogenous communication on within-group coordination and on between-group
competition in four treatments. In three treatments the communication channel is exogenously
varied to assess the effect of symmetric and asymmetric communication in the competitive coor-
dination game. In the control treatment (NC-NC), subjects cannot communicate, while in the
C-C treatment members of both groups are allowed to communicate with members of their own
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group. In the novel treatment C-NC, members of only one of the two groups can communicate
with members of their own group before their effort decision. In all communication treatments
communication between groups is not permitted. To study whether the effects of communication
persist when groups can choose whether to communicate and whether groups actually choose to
communicate even though communication may harm efficiency, the authors implement an endoge-
nous communication treatment according to the following procedure. After ten rounds of the
NC-NC treatment, three players in each group vote on whether to establish communication for the
successive ten rounds. Subjects vote twice: first, before round 11 on (not) to have communication
in rounds 11-20 and, second, before round 21 on (not) to have communication in rounds 21-30. In
both cases, subjects in a group have to reach unanimity.
The results of this study show that when communication is asymmetric (treatment C-NC),
the communicating and the non-communicating group behave quite differently. Specifically, the
non-communicating group in C-NC achieves similar coordination as the non-communicating group
in NC-NC and earns similar payoffs to the communicating group in the C-C treatment and lower
payoffs than the non-communicating groups in the NC-NC treatment. In contrast, the communicat-
ing group in C-NC achieves better coordination and earns higher payoffs than the communicating
group in the C-C treatment and similar payoffs to the non-communicating group in the NC-NC
treatment. In sum, within-group communication leads to more aggressive competition. (i.e., higher
efforts) which leads to lower payoffs and efficiency than in the absence of this kind of communica-
tion. This effect is strongest when within-group communication is possible in both groups. The
authors conclude that asymmetric communication has a less strong negative impact on payoffs and
efficiency than symmetric communication, but it still leads to lower efficiency relative to a setting
where communication is not allowed at all.
For the endogenous communication treatment, Cason et al. (2017) find that most groups choose
to communicate even though communication lowers efficiency. However, the authors find no differ-
ences in effort, coordination and payoffs between the endogenous and the exogenous treatments,
which suggests that what affects behavior is the type of communication channel, and not whether
such a channel is chosen endogenously or imposed exogenously.
2.3 Overview
Experiments on coordination games with communication have identified some broad regularities
which are briefly summarize here. First, costless pre-play communication can be effective at re-
solving coordination failure and inefficient coordination in organizational settings, even when it
is only one-way. Second, cheap talk works in both cases when messages are pre-determined and
when they are unrestricted. Third, communication helps reaching efficient coordination outcomes
independent of whether it is exogenously imposed or endogenously chosen. Fourth, in the latter
case, the choice of sending a message strongly depends on whether it is costly to do so and on how
costly it is, as the frequency of communication tends to decrease with its cost. Fifth, there may
also be a dark side of communication. Some of the reviewed studies show that communication
may be harmful for organizations when coordination among workers is associated with negative
external effects and has therefore the potential to be detrimental in terms of efficiency. Specif-
ically, communication within teams may make them behaving more aggressively in tournaments
and communication between teams can lead to collusion, which both may lower organizational
performance.
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3 Asymmetric Information
An inherent feature of many labor relationships is that information is distributed in an asymmetric
way between the employer and the employee. In the following, the focus is mostly on cases
where the employee has an information advantage over the employer, because the majority of the
experimental studies that have been conducted so far in this context refer to these cases. In this
context, a central distinction has to be made between “hidden action” and “hidden information”
problems (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). Hidden action (or moral hazard) problems emerge
when the employer is not able to observe the employee’s actions. A classical example concerns
a principal-agent problem where the employer (principal) can observe the output produced but
cannot monitor or verify the effort the employee (agent) has invested to produce this output. In
these situations, the employee may have an incentive to choose actions that are favorable to herself
but harm the employer (for instance, exerting inefficiently low effort). On the contrary, hidden
information (or adverse selection) problems occur when the employee’s ability or productivity are
not verifiable for the employer, in which case employees may have the incentive to conceal their
true ability.
3.1 Hidden action problems
A number of articles have investigated the role of communication in moral hazard settings. Char-
ness and Dufwenberg (2006) modify the classical “trust game” (Berg et al., 1995) to include hidden
action. In their game, the first mover represents the principal (or employer) and the second mover
the agent (or employee). The first mover has to choose between trusting and not trusting the second
mover (choosing action “In” and “Out”, respectively). The interpretation is that by choosing “In”
the principal can offer an incomplete labor contract with the potential to accrue gains from trade.
If the principal offers a contract (i.e., trusts), the agent can choose between a non-trustworthy ac-
tion (“Don’t roll”) and a trustworthy action (“Roll”). After “Roll”, the outcome for the principal
is stochastically determined: with a probability of 5/6 (1/6) the favorable (unfavorable) outcome is
realized. In this game, given that the principal trusts, profit-maximization requires that the agent
does not honor trust. A forward looking principal anticipates this and therefore does not trust
in the first place. In several experimental treatments, the authors vary a) the size of the outside
options for the players in case the principal does not trust and b) whether one player is allowed to
send free-form messages to the other player.
The authors find that one-way free-form communication from the agent to the principal has
a significant positive effect on the levels of trust, trustworthiness and, consequently, the realized
efficiency of the transactions. In contrast, allowing for one-way communication from the principal
to the agent does not change behavior relative to a control treatment without messages. In order
to test the link between players’ beliefs and choices and the interaction with communication, the
authors elicit both the first-order beliefs of the principals (i.e., the expected proportion of second
movers who choose “Roll”) and the second-order beliefs of agents (i.e., their expectations about the
average beliefs by the principal). Using this information the authors find that the interpretation
of the content of the messages plays an important role for decisions. Specifically, messages sent by
the agents that can be categorized as promises to take the trustworthy action are associated with
significantly higher trust, trustworthiness and realized efficiency as compared to messages that do
not involve a promise.
In a variation of the described experiment, Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) conduct an ad-
ditional treatment in which, contrary to the original setup in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
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agents cannot send free-form messages, but can only choose between making a “bare promise”
(sending a pre-formulated message that the agent intends to choose “Roll”) and sending no mes-
sage. In this treatment, the large majority of agents send a promise. However, while the share of
agents who behave in a trustworthy manner increases somewhat relative to the control condition
without communication, the share of principals who trust the agent does not increase. Hence,
taking together the results from both studies, it appears that in the investigated setting free-form
communication is more effective in enhancing trust and efficiency than (pre-formulated) reduced
form messages including promises.
Building on the experimental setup introduced by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Hoppe and
Schmitz (2018) analyze a situation in which principals and agents bargain over labor contracts in
an alternating offer protocol. When a contract is concluded, agents’ chosen effort can be either high
or low which in turn affects the principal’s payoff. Similar to Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), if
a low effort is chosen, the payoff for the principal is low with certainty (bad outcome). If the agent
chooses high effort, the principal’s payoff is high with a high probability (5/6 - good outcome),
but the bad outcome can still be realized (with probability 1/6). The possible parameters that
can enter the contract between principal and agents (wages or effort levels) depends on the specific
treatments, as described below.
The authors implement eight treatment variations which vary the verifiability and observability
of agents’ efforts as well as whether or not principals and agents can communicate by sending
messages to each other both before and during the negotiation. In a first set of four treatments,
the outcome is contractible; that is, the output of the agent can be observed by both players, and
wages can be made contingent on the realized output. The second set of treatments adds private
information on the side of the principal to each condition, such that only the principal will be
informed which outcome has materialized, implying that contracts cannot condition wages on the
output.
Hoppe and Schmitz (2018) find a significant positive effect of communication when effort is
not observable (i.e., hidden action). In these treatments, expected total surplus for principals and
agents is increased with communication. On the other hand, when effort is verifiable and contracts
can specify the effort level to be provided by the agent, communication does not significantly
change the expected total surplus. The authors also analyze the communication content which
allows them to provide some more insights into the mechanisms that might drive the positive effect
of communication. Specifically, when outcome is contractible and effort hidden, communication
allows the principal to explain the agent that—given an incentive-compatible contract was agreed
upon—it is optimal to exert high effort, which reduces strategic uncertainty. This would explain
why in the treatments where effort is verifiable—thus, no strategic uncertainty—communication
has no effect. Moreover, in the case with information asymmetries on both sides, where effort is
unobservable and the output is not contractible, communication is associated with higher wage
offers and more frequent choices of high efforts. In this case, the content analysis reveals that
when agents chose high effort levels often a promise was made, whereas in the cases with low effort
levels this was not the case. This result is similar to the observations in the study by Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006), and is consistent with guilt aversion on the side of the agents.
An important workhorse to explore employer-employee relationships that involve moral hazard
is the “gift-exchange game”. In this game, the employer sets a (non performance-contingent)
wage for the employee who in the next step decides on the effort level. Effort is costly for the
worker, but generates revenues for the employer. In the standard gift-exchange setting a profit-
maximizing employee would exert minimum effort at each given wage level and, anticipating this,
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profit-maximizing employers would offer the lowest possible wage. Yet, starting with the seminal
study by Fehr et al. (1993), it has been shown that, typically, employers pay higher than minimum
wages, employees choose higher than minimum effort and there is a significant positive relationship
between wages offered and efforts chosen. Numerous replications of this experiment have shown
the robustness of these results in many different circumstances (see Charness and Kuhn, 2011, and
Casoria and Riedl, 2013, for surveys of the literature on gift-exchange experiments).
Several studies have investigated how communication interacts with gift-exchange. Cooper
and Lightle (2013) conduct two experiments on variants of the gift-exchange game. In the first
experiment, they introduce one-sided communication from the employee to the employer. Here,
the central question is whether communication is used by employees as a substitute for costly
effort to reciprocate to the wage choice of the employer, or, alternatively, as a means to foster the
employers’ learning about the positive wage-effort relationship that the latter can utilize in later
rounds of the game. When communication is possible, employees can send a free-form message
to the employer after being informed about the wage offer but before choosing their efforts. If a
message is sent, the employer observes this message together with the employee’s effort level. The
experiment is implemented in a strangers design where employers and workers are rematched with
different partners in each of the 20 periods. Two treatments are implemented which differ in when
employee messages are available. In the Messages First treatment, messages are available only
in the first 10 rounds and in the Messages Second messages are available only in the last 10
rounds.
Results show that the introduction of messages significantly increases wage offers and effort
levels in both treatments, due to employees’ reciprocity. Moreover, messages have a lasting effect
in the Messages First treatment, because even after the possibility of sending messages has been
removed, wages, effort and profits of employer and employees remain at a high level. Importantly,
the data show that, communication does not alter the wage-effort relationship. This rejects the
hypothesis that communication and effort are substitutes and supports the alternative hypothesis
that communication fosters employers’ learning about the profitability of gift-exchange. A content
analysis of messages supports this interpretation. Messages that express positive or negative senti-
ments against the employer do not affect wages in future rounds. In contrast, messages that contain
an advice for the employer and explain that higher wages lead to higher effort are associated with
higher wages in subsequent rounds.
The second experiment is conducted to provide further evidence for the notion that messages
lead to higher wages by helping employers to learn about the positive relationship between wages
and effort. In this experiment, employers are exogenously provided with information about this
relationship. In particular, in the first 10 out of 20 experimental rounds, employers receive feedback
on the wage, effort and payoffs of one employer-employee pair randomly drawn from the same round
in a previous session without communication. The authors find that feedback also has a positive
impact on wages here, but the effect is smaller than with the possibility to communicate. According
to the authors, this might be related to the fact that the feedback given is noisier than messages
and provides less guidance to employers concerning the wage to choose.
Bolton and Werner (2016) implement a gift-exchange experiment in which one department
head interacts with two employees that are heterogeneous regarding their productivity (i.e., their
efforts affect the department head’s profits differently). While the main focus of the study is on the
employees’ responses to wage differences, two treatments investigate how communication influences
gift-exchange. In these treatments, department heads can send a text message to both employees
together with their wage offers. When wage differences are transparent, communication may have
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a strategic value for the department head. For instance, it could be used to explain the wage
difference in order to avoid negative reactions by those workers who receive a lower wage.
In this study, communication is found to have a significant effect on behavior of both depart-
ment heads and employees. First, wage offers in the treatments where communication is possible
tend to be larger than in the treatment without communication and this difference is particularly
pronounced for offers to high productivity employees. Moreover, controlling for wage offers, cer-
tain types of messages are significantly correlated with effort levels, but their effectiveness depends
on the employee type. Appealing to fairness and emphasizing efficiency gains is associated with
increased efforts by high productivity employees, while justifications of inferior payments have a
positive impact on efforts of low productivity employees. These observations suggest that the ef-
fectiveness of communication may depend on specific characteristics of the interaction partners,
like productivity.
In the one-shot gift-exchange setting by Is¸gin (2017) firms differ in the marginal return for each
unit of workers’ effort. In a competitive market setting with excess supply of workers, firms make
wage offers to workers and—upon being hired—workers choose their effort levels. Two treatments
differ in whether a firm’s productivity type is public information (i.e., the worker receives this
information together with the wage offer) or remains private information of the firm. Two other
treatments vary whether or not free-form chat messages can be sent to all participants in the
experimental session. The author finds that, without communication, public information does not
change average wages and effort as compared to a setting with private information. However, giving
the possibility to communicate has a strong positive effect on wage and effort levels, irrespective
of whether productivity differences are transparent or not.
Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009) utilize the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) to explore the role of
contracts between employer and employee in the presence of moral hazard and how it interacts
with communication. In this experiment, first and second movers can communicate either via
messages containing numerical information (proposals and counter-proposals on the amounts to
be sent and returned) or via free-form chat. In addition, participants have the possibility to enter
contracts that lead to binding choices, conditional on the consent of both interaction partners.
Communication increases efficiency in this setting. In particular, the highest levels of trust and
trustworthiness are achieved in the interaction that integrates free-form chat. Furthermore, when
contracts can be written, more than 70% of the interacting partners refuses these contracts and
relies solely on trust.
Charness et al. (2013) investigate whether the contracting procedure between firm and workers
affects gift-exchange between the two parties and find support for this conjecture. These authors
implement a version of the gift-exchange game that consists of three stages. In the first stage,
one party offers a contract to the other party. In the second stage, the receiver of the offer either
accepts or rejects it. Upon acceptance, in the third stage the worker chooses an effort level which
is costly to the worker and generates profits for the firm. The authors conduct four treatments
that vary a) whether the firm or the worker proposes the contract, and b) whether the contract
proposal specifies only the binding wage level or also a non-binding effort level. Since the effort
level is non-binding, it is considered cheap talk from a theoretical perspective.
A main result of this study is that the contractual procedure matters for the final outcome.
When workers propose the contract and the contract also includes an effort level, the effort exerted
is significantly higher than in all other conditions. In particular, effort promises by the worker
increase actual effort relative to the treatments where no cheap-talk is possible (i.e., when the
contract only specifies the wage). In contrast, effort requests by the firm do not have an effect on
13
effort choices. Moreover, the share of workers who provide effort of at least the level suggested in
the contract is significantly higher in the treatment where workers propose the effort level. This
findings indicate that workers have an inclination to live up to their effort promises.
Testing for patterns of gift-exchange in the field, Davies and Fafchamps (2017) focus on the use
and effectiveness of promises and feedback in labor relationships in Ghana. In this experiment,
students and entrepreneurs from Ghana were recruited as participants. Students were in the role
of workers, whereas entrepreneurs were recruited for the role of employers. The authors implement
a modified version of the gift-exchange game where, depending on the treatment, the workers can
make a promise to the employers about future effort choices and the employers can send either
positive or negative feedback to the workers after effort has been chosen. The game is repeated
and each period of the game consists of three stages. In the contracting stage, the employer can
choose to make an offer to the worker, who can then either accept or reject it. Upon acceptance,
in the second stage, the worker receives a wage and chooses either a low or a high effort level. In
the final stage, the employer is asked what wage she would offer if the worker chose low effort and
what she would do if the worker chose high effort. The worker is asked for the minimum payment
at which they would accept the offer. If the offer and the desired minimum payment are consistent,
the worker and the employer will contract again with each other in the next period, skipping the
first stage. If there is no match, contracting in the next period will happen as before.
Four treatments are implemented. In treatments 1E and 1C, workers and employees cannot
communicate. In the former of these two treatments workers can choose between providing high
and low effort, while in the latter workers can only choose the high effort. The comparison between
these two treatments permits to assess the effects of not having fully enforceable contracts. Two
treatments are run to investigate the role of communication. In treatment 1EM, the employer can
choose between no feedback, three positive and three negative feedback messages to send to the
worker after the effort choice. In treatment 1EMP, in addition, the worker can make a predefined
promise for the next period stating: “If you offer me a high payment, I will choose high effort.”
Subjects participate in all four treatments and are rematched after each treatment.
In accordance with most of the gift-exchange literature, Davies and Fafchamps (2017) find pos-
itive reciprocity in all treatments, i.e., effort is higher in response to higher wages. Introducing the
possibility of giving feedback has no effect on wage offers, but it significantly increases workers’
reciprocity at high wages. They choose high effort more frequently compared to the no-feedback
treatments. However, workers’ promises (in addition to employers’ feedback) do not have a signif-
icant impact on wage offers, effort choices or the wage-effort relationship. Taken together, these
results suggest that the effectiveness of communication in the setting under study depends on the
wage that is offered and that worker promises on top of employer feedback has no additional effect.
3.2 Hidden information problems
The role of communication in settings with hidden information has been examined in a couple of
studies. First, Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) focus on the hidden information problem that
emerges when agents differ in their abilities that cannot be observed and verified by the principal.
In this case, low-ability agents have an incentive to conceal their true type. In the implemented
setting, agents can be either of high or of low ability and there are two types of jobs, one that
requires high ability and one that requires low ability.
To investigate the role of communication, Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) implement a 3× 2
design, where three conditions that differ in the surplus created by the participation of the low-
ability agent are interacted with whether or not communication is possible. In one treatment, if a
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contract is offered by the principal and the agent chooses the low-ability job, the surplus generated
is higher for both principal and agent compared to the case when no contract is offered at all.
Hence, the participation of the low-ability agent is Pareto-improving over the no contract situation.
However, rational agents would choose the high-ability job after receiving a contract, irrespective
of their true ability, and the principal’s best response is not to offer a contract. In the other two
treatments that vary the payoff structure, behavioral predictions for rational principals and agents
do not change, but participation of the low-ability agent does not lead to a Pareto-improvement.
In the communication treatment variation, in one case the agent can send a free-form message to
the principal after being informed about the type and before the principal decides whether or not
to offer a contract, whereas in the second case such communication is impossible.
In the treatment where participation of low-ability agents is Pareto-improving, communication
is found to be effective at mitigating the hidden information problem. The share of low-ability
agents who choose the low-ability job after being offered a contract is almost twice as high when
communication is possible than when it is not. The share of principals who offer a contract
also increases, but not significantly so compared to the no-communication setting. Moreover, the
analysis of the communication content reveals that a large share of low-ability agents sends messages
that reveal their true type and include promises to take the low-ability job. These promises almost
always result in a job offer by the principal. In addition, if a contract is offered after such a message,
the low-ability agents always keep their promise and choose the action they announced. In contrast,
when low-ability agents participation cannot lead to a Pareto-improving outcome, communication
has no positive effect. In this case, only a minority of low-ability agents chooses the low-ability
job, irrespective of whether communication is allowed or not. Taken together, these results suggest
that communication is effective in utilizing the potential contribution of the low-ability agents to
the joint surplus.
Building on the framework of Charness and Dufwenberg (2011), Goeree and Zhang (2014)
introduce competition among agents. Their aim is to study whether communication leads to
efficient contracting also in the scenario where two agents compete for a single job. The authors
use the one-shot hidden information game introduced above and implement treatments with and
without communication, and with and without competition between agents. Goeree and Zhang
(2014) also vary a third dimension, namely whether or not the principal’s payoff resulting from the
trustworthy action by the high-ability agent is uncertain. The authors find no significant differences
between treatments with and without uncertain payoffs and consider only the pooled data.
In the no-competition treatments, one principal is paired with one agent. In the treatments
with competition, each principal is paired with two agents and has to select one of the two before
playing the hidden information game. In the communication treatments, both agents can send
one-way free-form messages to the principal. Agents cannot observe each other’s messages, which
can be seen by the principal only.
The authors find that communication raises efficiency when there is no competition, thus con-
firming the findings of Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). In addition, they find that competition
raises efficiency when there is no communication. However, efficiency decreases when competition
is introduced in the setting where communication is available. By analyzing the content of the
messages in the different treatments, Goeree and Zhang (2014) provide an explanation for this
negative efficiency effect of communication: with competition fewer messages are sent that contain
information about the ability of an agent, which makes it more difficult for the principal to select
high-ability agents. In turn, principals become more cautious and hire an agent less often than
in the absence of competition. Overall, the results of this study show that communication and
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competition can act as substitutes and highlight the fragility of communication as a means to
increase efficiency.
3.3 Overview
In summary, the results from the studies reviewed in this section suggest that communication can
help mitigate problems arising from information asymmetries between employer and employees.
Several studies find that communication mitigates moral hazard and leads to more gift exchange.
Moreover, although the literature is not entirely conclusive, it seems that free-form communication
is more effective at reducing moral hazard than restricted and standardized communication. Only
a couple of studies exist investigating the effect of communication in hidden information settings.
These studies suggest that the effect of communication is context dependent. Specifically, when
interactions between employer and employee are bilateral, communication significantly improves
efficiency when participation of the employee is possible. Yet, if competition is introduced into
this setting the effect of communication is reversed.
4 Incentives
The papers reviewed in this section focus on the interaction of communication with the monetary
incentive scheme that the employee is exposed to. The first part of this section surveys papers
that address the question of how communication interacts with different incentive schemes. The
second part deals with papers that study whether adverse affects for the organization triggered by
performance-based compensation schemes can be mitigated by communication. The final section,
reviews selected studies examining the role of communication in diverse public good settings, which
can be seen as describing teamwork, and are thus relevant to organizational settings.
4.1 Monetary and non-monetary incentive schemes, communication and
effort
How do different incentive schemes respond to the introduction of communication? Harbring
(2006) contributes to answering this question by comparing a team and a tournament incentive
scheme under two communication channels. One channel is one-way and allows only for restricted
messages whereas the other channel is two-way and allows for free-form messages. Participants are
randomly matched in pairs and have to choose an effort level. In the team compensation scheme,
the two agents are equally rewarded on the basis of their collective output. Under this incentive
scheme, the Nash equilibrium predicts inefficiently low levels of effort. In the tournament incentive
scheme, the two agents are rewarded according to the ranking of their outputs. The agent choosing
the higher effort level receives a larger payoff (a winner prize) than the agent with the lower effort.
Here, the unique Nash equilibrium predicts that both agents exert maximal effort. Importantly,
however, agents can improve their joint payoff by coordinating on lower efforts.
In the study six treatments are implemented, all consisting of a total of 20 rounds. At the
beginning of the experiment participants are informed that there are 10 rounds of interaction and
that afterwards the experiment will continue in a manner not disclosed in advance. After the first
10 rounds, it is then announced that another 10 rounds with the same pair matching will be played.
In two control treatments (Team and Tourn) no communication between agents is allowed. In
two treatments (TeamAnn and TournAnn), communication is restricted to announcing effort
levels, i.e. one agent in each pair can announce the effort she intends to choose before both
agents simultaneously decide on their effort. The opportunity to make an announcement alternates
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between agents so that each agent announces an effort level 10 times during the 20 rounds of
interaction. Further, in two chat treatments (TeamChat and TournChat) both players in a
pair can simultaneously send unrestricted messages to each other throughout the experiment.
The results show that overall, under both incentive schemes, communication leads to more
coordination than in settings without communication. More precisely, average effort and the per-
centage of maximal efforts are highest in TeamChat and lowest in TournChat, while restricted
communication leads to effort choices that lie between these two extremes. In the tournament
setting, the opportunity to announce the effort choice facilitates collusion between subjects, so
that they are able to alternate in winning the prize and obtain equal payoffs in the end. The chat
instead helps to keep effort stable over time both in the team and in the tournament compensation
schemes.
In another study, besides exploring the interaction effects of communication and monetary in-
centives, Kvaløy et al. (2015) investigate whether communication per se can increase the motivation
of the workforce and lead to higher efforts. The authors conduct a field experiment in which they
hire students, who are not aware of participating in an experiment, to enter data from official ice
hockey game reports into a database. Subjects are randomly assigned to one of four treatments
varying two dimensions: performance pay versus no performance pay and motivational talk ver-
sus no motivational talk. In the two treatments with motivational talk, subjects were exposed
to simple motivational sentences meant to (potentially) enhance intrinsic motivation. In the two
performance pay treatments, subjects received a small piece rate on top of the fixed payment for
each game report they enter into the database.
The authors find that adding the motivational talk to pay for performance significantly increases
the number of entered games. The authors note that motivational talk alone also has a positive but
insignificant effect on the number of entered games, while performance pay alone has a significantly
negative effect. The same results are found when analyzing the quality of work as performance
pay alone leads on average to more mistakes per entered cell, but combining performance pay and
motivational talk significantly decreases the number of mistakes. Motivational talk and monetary
incentives, therefore, appear to be complements. Subjects respond to the motivational talk by
increasing their performance only when they also receive a performance pay.
4.2 Incentives and counterproductive behavior
A couple of studies aim at understanding the role of communication in the context of counter-
productive behavior when workers might choose actions that are detrimental for the employers or
for other workers. The first study explores sabotage, i.e., employees who take actions to reduce
the performance of their colleagues. The second study analyzes a setting in which employees have
incentives to harm the employer.
Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011) use a laboratory experiment to study sabotage in repeated
tournaments. In the experiment, one principal is matched with three agents and decides which
tournament contract to offer. Such a contract rewards the agents with the highest output with
the winner prize and the other two agents with lower loser prizes. A contract specifies the total
wage sum and the wage spread, i.e., the difference between the winner prize and the loser prizes.
The agents observe the contract and simultaneously choose effort, which increases own output, and
sabotage, which reduces the output of the other agents.
In the Baseline treatment, the setting just described is implemented using neutral framing. In
the Chat treatment, the four players are allowed to communicate with each other during the whole
game. In the Framing treatment, communication is not permitted and the setting is framed as
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an employment situation and where the agents’ actions are called “effort” and “sabotage”.
In all treatments, Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011) find that both effort and sabotage levels
increase with the wage spread, with the increase in sabotage being stronger than the increase in
effort. There is also evidence for positive reciprocity, as effort is higher for the high wage sum
than for the low wage sum, while sabotage does not differ for different wage sums. The two
treatments Framing and Chat are implemented to analyze possible ways of curbing sabotage.
The authors find that framing the situation as an employment context and explicitly using the
term sabotage indeed significantly reduce sabotage. Importantly, introducing communication has
an even stronger impact on behavior and leads to significantly higher effort and lower sabotage. In
particular, it appears that communication reduces sabotage because principals and agents manage
to coordinate on high fixed wages that yield high effort, low sabotage and higher joint payoffs.
Cardella and Depew (2018) use a real-effort task to investigate the presence of workers’ ratchet
effect. That is, the phenomenon that workers strategically restrict their current output, relative
to their capability, because they anticipate that high levels of productivity will lead to increased
expectations or lower pay in the future. In the experiment, workers complete a real-effort work
task over two periods under a piece-rate incentive scheme. In particular, workers have to stuff and
seal donor solicitation mailers in two working periods of 10 minutes each, with a 10 minutes break
in-between. During this break, the experimenter counts the number of completed mailers for each
participant and indicates on a sheet their total, their compensation for the first period, and their
piece-rate for the second period.
In the Baseline treatment, a fixed piece-rate scheme is used in both periods in order to identify
the distribution of the true output capability of the participants and rule out strategic motivations
to reduce output. In the three main experimental conditions, workers receive a reduced piece-
rate in the second work period if productivity is too high in the first work period, relative to an
exogenously set productivity threshold. In the Individual treatment, workers’ productivity is
evaluated at the individual level. In the Group treatment, productivity is evaluated collectively
for a group of seven workers. Finally, the GroupComm treatment is the same as Group, except
that workers can communicate face-to-face before the task starts.
The authors find that workers significantly increase productivity in the second period of Base-
line. In Individual, workers significantly lower their output below the productivity threshold in
the first period, consistent with the ratchet effect. In contrast, in Group, the first period output
distribution is very similar to the one in Baseline, so workers do not seem to restrict their output
to avoid receiving a lower compensation in the second period. Specifically, without communication,
workers in Group fail to coordinate on lower output and rather try to free-ride on the output re-
striction of others in the group. Importantly, allowing for pre-play communication among workers
in GroupComm leads to a significant output restriction in the first period, providing evidence
for the ratchet effect. This result indicates that communication facilitates coordination on out-
put restrictions and may play an important role in the emergence of the ratchet effect in group
compensation schemes.
4.3 Communication in public good settings
The incentive structure in public good games resembles teamwork situations with free-riding oppor-
tunities. Therefore, insights from the literature on the effect of communication in public good games
can be informative for communication effects in organizational settings. Early on researchers have
looked into whether communication can help to overcome free-riding tendencies. In their seminal
study, Isaac and Walker (1988) explored between-group, within-group and sequencing comparisons
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on the effects of communication on contribution behavior in a voluntary contribution mechanism
(VCM, also known as linear public good). The reference treatment was one where communication
was not allowed. Communication was basically free-form with some restrictions depending on the
treatment. The results showed that in any communication treatment contributions to the public
good where higher than when communication was not allowed. Interestingly, when communication
was allowed in the beginning but disallowed later, the positive effect remained indicating a positive
spillover effect of communication.
In the aforementioned treatments all participants had the same endowments. Isaac and Walker
(1988) also investigated how communication affects contribution behavior when endowments are
asymmetric. Specifically, the authors compared treatments with symmetric and asymmetric en-
dowment where communication was allowed in the first 10 periods but not allowed in the second 10
periods. With communication voluntary contributions where high with symmetric and asymmetric
endowments, albeit contributions were somewhat lower in the latter case. When the possibility
to communicate was removed contributions remained high with symmetric endowments but broke
down completely with asymmetric endowments.
In another influential early paper on the topic, Ostrom et al. (1992) explored the effect of
communication alone as well as in combination with a sanctioning mechanism in a common pool
resource (CPR) setting. In their one-shot communication treatment participants played a CPR
for 10 periods without communication, after which they had the possibility to discuss the decision
problem for 10 minutes followed by another up to 22 periods of the CPR without communication.
In the repeated communication treatment participants also played a CPR for 10 periods without
communication, but now followed by the possibility to discuss the decision problem after each
subsequent period. In both cases communication had a positive impact on the net yield from
the common pool. When the endowment was low the net yield increased from 34% without
communication to 99% with repeated communication, and when the endowment was high the net
yield increased from 21% without communication to 55% with one-shot communication and 73%
with repeated communication. This clearly showed that communication is also beneficial in CPR
environments. In addition, the authors also found that when communication is combined with a
sanctioning mechanism the efficiency increasing effects of communication are reinforced.
Summarizing public good experiments up to 2002 in a meta-analysis, Zelmer (2003) reports that
(cheap-talk) communication among participants significantly increased the mean contributions to
the public good relative to the no communication case. In a more recent survey of a few post-2003
public goods experiments allowing for different forms of communication patters, Chaudhuri (2011)
corroborates this finding. Bochet et al. (2006) allow for three different communication types—face-
to-face, chat-room, numerical cheap talk—and find that the first two lead to significantly increased
contributions, whereas the last one does not exhibit a discernible effect relative to a situation
without communication. In a follow-up study, Bochet and Putterman (2009) explored (among other
things) if adding promises to numerical cheap talk affects contribution behavior. They report that
this is not case. However, when numerical cheap talk is combined with punishment or promises and
punishment contributions to the public good increase relative to a no communication benchmark.
In study related the aforementioned ones, Masclet et al. (2013) study if communication in the form
or cheap-talk threats to punish non-cooperative behavior affects public good contributions. In their
study the authors allow for peer-punishment as in Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) but add a preliminary
Threat stage where players can announce a threat to punish by submitting a threat schedule
conditional on the contributions of the other players. The results show that communication, in
the form of cheap-talk threats, increases contributions. Interestingly, threats are generally much
harsher than actually dealt out punishment. In another treatment where players are informed about
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threats afterwards and can also punish deviations from threats, threats and actual punishment are
more aligned. The authors report that overall contributions, punishment and, consequently, welfare
in the treatments with communication do not differ from a baseline treatment without threats.
Chaudhuri et al. (2006) studied the effect of communication in an intergenerational advice
setting (Schotter, 2003). In this setting an earlier generation of participants who played the public
good game can give advice to a later generation on how to play the game. This can be done
privately from an individual player to another individual player, publicly where individual players
of the later generation can see all individual advice of the earlier generation, and the advice can
be made common knowledge by being read out aloud. The results show that only when advice is
common knowledge it has a significantly positive effect on public good contributions. The authors
attribute this effect to social learning which is more difficult or impossible when advice is private
or public.
Oprea et al. (2014) analyze the role of free-form communication in discrete time and continuous
time public good problems. They find little differences in contributions between the discrete
time and continuous time setting when communication was not allowed. However, with free-
form communication contributions increased in both settings, with an especially strong and robust
increase when the game was in continuous time.
Only a few studies explore the role of communication for leadership in public goods settings.
Pogrebna et al. (2011) and Dannenberg (2015) compare leading-by-example with leading-by-words
in slightly different settings. The main difference between these studies is that in the former there
is no pre-announced last period, whereas in the latter participants are informed about how long
the game will take. Both studies compare the effect of a binding commitment of the leader (i.e.,
the leader is the first to contribute to the public good) and a non-binding announcement (i.e.,
the leader announces how much he or she plans to contribute) to an environment without com-
munication and commitment. The results of the two studies regarding the role of communication
are mixed. Pogrebna et al. (2011) find that both leading-by-example and leading-by-words in-
creases contributions to the public good, whereas Dannenberg (2015) reports a positive effect only
of leading-by-example. The latter author concludes that “when players are appointed to lead by
example they tend to set good examples, arguably because that role comes with a certain kind of
observability. In contrast, when subjects are appointed to lead by words, they pledge to contribute
a large amount but the actually chosen contribution is much smaller.” (p. 84).
4.4 Overview
Communication is found to be effective at increasing agents’ performance under monetary in-
centive schemes. In particular, free-form communication appears to work better than restricted
messages both at increasing effort and at improving coordination. Communication in the form of
motivational talk has a positive effect on agents’ performance when it is combined with monetary
incentives. When given the chance to engage in sabotage and reduce a co-worker’s performance,
agents do so if they do not have the possibility to communicate with each other. Introducing
communication, decreases sabotage, improves coordination between principal and agents and has
a positive effect on agents’ efforts. However, in a dynamic setting, by facilitating agents’ coordi-
nation on low effort levels, communication leads to output restrictions and eases the emergence
of the ratchet effect. In public good environments, that resemble teamwork settings, generally
communication has positive effects, albeit some qualifications need to be put in place. It helps
to overcome the free-rider problem in symmetric and asymmetric endowments, but the positive
spillover effects of communication to environments without communication do not survive when
20
endowments are unequal. Communication increases efficiency in common resource problems and
this effect is enhanced when combined with a sanctioning institution. When communication is in
the form of advice from one to another generation it only works when the advice is common knowl-
edge. Communication significantly increases cooperation in continuous time public good games.
However, adding communication in the form or punishment threats does not have a significant
positive effect. Finally, the few studies investigating leading-by-words report mixed results relative
to leading-by-example and settings without leadership.
5 Summary
In this paper, selected experimental papers have been reviewed that test the role of communication
in organizational environments. These studies show that communication significantly and robustly
affects decision-makers’ behavior. Several main conclusions can be traced from this experimental
literature.
With respect to coordination, communication is found to be generally effective in improving
coordination in organizational settings. This is true both with restricted and unrestricted commu-
nication and regardless of whether or not communication is mandatory or optional. Importantly,
when incentives of the decision-makers are aligned, communication improves payoffs and efficiency.
However, communication can also be associated with lower efficiency and lower performance when
coordination is associated with negative externalities. In these cases, communication may lead to
collusive practices, lower efforts and lower organizational performance.
Second, communication is found to have a positive effect in situations with information asym-
metries between employer and employee. Communication mitigates moral hazard problems and
leads to more trust and trustworthiness in the labor relationship, reflected, for example, in a higher
frequency of contract offers, higher wages and higher employee performance. The results of some
studies suggest that richer free-form communication is more suited to achieve this positive effect
than restricted and limited communication. Moreover, in the context of hidden information about
the ability of employees, the results so far suggest that communication improves efficiency when the
participation of low-ability employees would be efficiency-enhancing and employers and employees
interact bilaterally.
Furthermore, communication is effective in shaping performance under monetary incentive
schemes, with positive effects under team incentives but negative effects under tournament in-
centives. Also, there is evidence for an interaction between communication and performance pay,
as the combination of motivational talk and pay-for-performance increases employee performance.
At the same time, the evidence on the impact of communication on counterproductive behavior
appears to be mixed. On the one hand, communication reduces sabotage among employees, but on
the other hand it may facilitate collusive practices which lower performance from the perspective of
the company. In public goods settings—resembling teamwork incentives in organization—overall,
communication has a positive effect for overcoming free-riding. These positive effects appear to be
somewhat weaker in asymmetric environments. In teamwork, communication is also effective when
combined with sanctioning mechanisms except when communication is reduced to threats. Surpris-
ingly little research has been performed on the interaction between leadership and communication
in public good settings and the existing results are inconclusive.
Overall, the majority of the experimental studies suggest that communication fosters both
coordination and cooperation within organizations. As the results show, this can be positive or
negative for the organization as a whole depending on the externality created by employee behavior.
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In the light of these results, while the literature on communication in labor settings has been rapidly
grown in recent years, there are many unexplored areas of research in which controlled experiments
can help to advance our understanding of behavior within organizations.
Up to now, the role of communication has been addressed in a relatively small number of
organizational contexts and with respect to a limited range of topics. Hence, there is still large
potential to broaden the scope of this research field. An interesting application, for instance, is
in the context of remuneration practices. As highlighted in Section 4, although communication is
systematically related to the effectiveness of incentive schemes, the respective literature focused
explicitly on communication is still small. The existing large experimental literature that does
not include communication clearly shows that social preferences shape employees’ response to the
wages they receive (see Dohmen, 2014, for a survey of the literature). As wages and wage changes
are usually communicated to employees by their supervisors, it would be worthwhile to understand
whether communication fosters or hinders the process through which wages are accepted, and if
so what communication style is most effective.
More generally, many studies show that communication does affect behavior, but there is little
systematic evidence about the impact of specific communication channels and content for the pro-
cesses within organizations. Therefore, it is yet not fully understood why exactly communication
works, or under which circumstances. A careful analysis of different communication patterns and
of what precisely is communicated could provide researchers with useful insights. As Brandts et al.
(2019) suggest, coding software and machine learning techniques might be helpful in this respect. In
this context, it would also be interesting to investigate further to what extent content and commu-
nication channel interact with each other, and in particular, whether the content of communication
systematically depends on the channel through which communication is transmitted.
Most studies reviewed in this paper are based on abstract settings and many of them allow for
communication only either via pre-determined messages or via anonymous chat protocols. While
this abstraction is important to ensure a high degree of control and has been useful to generate
clean results, these modes of communication are relatively impersonal ways of interacting. Since
personal relationships are important in the workplace, it seems worthwhile to investigate the impact
of more complex forms of communication on the interactions between employers and workers, and
within teams of workers. Indeed, some of the reviewed studies on communication in public good
settings suggest that free-form or face-to-face communication can be powerful.
Finally, the impact of communication flows is not properly understood. Theoretical work (as
mentioned in the introduction to this paper) show that communication flows may have a decisive
impact on economic outcomes, such as efficiency and equilibrium selection, but the analysis so far is
conducted for relatively simple settings. Here, experimental investigations could help to establish
robust behavioral patterns related to strategic interaction within organizations that could be an
important input for further theoretical developments.
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